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Becoming the advocate for US-based multinationals: The 
United States Council of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, 1945–1974
Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl
ieP, university of Lausanne, Lausanne, switzerland
ABSTRACT
The United States Council for International Business today is one of the 
United States most powerful domestic business organisations and is a 
leading ambassador for US international business interests abroad. It is 
also the US affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and Business at OECD. At 
its founding in 1945, the United States Council of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (as it was called until 1981) was intended to 
represent the specific interests of US-based multinationals striving to 
expand their international trade and investments. Based on new archi-
val documents, this article aims to shed light on the largely under- 
researched history of the US Council, demonstrating that the Council 
gained prominence during the 1960s and 1970s through a series of 
political campaigns aimed at defending and expanding American com-
panies’ international direct investments.
A few years ago, the United States Council for International Business (USCIB) commemorated 
its beginnings and declared: ‘In 1945, Philip Reed and other American executives founded 
the United States Council for International Business to represent the views of the US business 
community on the international stage. Seventy years later, our calling to exercise global 
leadership has never been more important’.1 To represent global leadership of US business 
was already the credo followed by the executives who had been involved with the US Council 
during the first two decades of its existence. During that period, some of the most powerful 
business leaders of the United States joined forces to make the US Council into an instrument 
to promote the specific interests of large US-based multinational enterprises (MNE). Since 
its origins in the interwar years, the US Council had been the American affiliate of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). It was therefore both through this powerful inter-
national business association and in relation with the government that the US Council 
pushed policies that would accommodate the expansion of these MNE’s international invest-
ments and trade. The dual purpose of this organisation of acting in the framework of an 
international business association and also assuming the function of a classical business 
interest association (BIA) in relation with its national government sometimes weakened its 
political leverage during the first decade of its existence. However, in the context of the 
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rising international expansion of US firms through foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
government’s attempts to control these capital outflows in the 1960s, the US Council seized 
this issue and gained legitimacy and purpose in the landscape of other BIAs. It also overcame 
its exclusive ties with the ICC by participating in the US section of the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD2 – with three other BIAs in 1962 and as the only 
representative after 1984. The US Council would further expand its affiliations with transna-
tional business associations by becoming the sole US affiliate of the International Organisation 
of Employers (IOE) in 1979.3
Based notably on the organisations’ archival documents and on congressional records, this 
article aims to provide a first investigation of the USCIB’s history.4 It will show how this business 
association managed to promote an international policy agenda which prepared the ground 
for the tremendous expansion of US business abroad during the first three post-war decades. 
It will furthermore shed light on the functioning of the ICC’s most powerful national section 
and allow for a better understanding of the split role of BIAs that function as national affiliates 
to transnational business organisations.5 Its position among other BIAs also is related to the 
necessity of carving out a specific function and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of company 
leaders, in the case of the US Council pre-existing and more powerful organisations such as 
the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States. Finally, the study contributes to research on the role of multinationals in US politics 
and more specifically on the history of American business associations in the post-war era.6
Establishing a voice for US global business
Since the founding of the ICC in 1919 – a quickly expanding international association of 
business leaders to deal with international economic issues such as trade, commercial arbi-
tration, standardisation, or transportation – there had been a group called the American 
Section of the ICC. It was however attached to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 
financially dependent on it, and had been struggling with a significant budget deficit and 
decreasing membership since the beginning of the 1930s (Stebenne, 2005, p. 60). After World 
War II, this group was reorganised and established as a now independent organisation in 
New York named The United States Associates of the International Chamber of Commerce.7 
The business leaders behind the founding of this new organisation were trustees of the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED), a recently created business research association 
involved in post-war planning (Schriftgiesser, 1960; Whitham, 2013; Domhoff, 2016). Frustrated 
with the CED’s then still lacking engagement with international issues, these six men, all tied 
to very large firms with global reach, decided that a new association was needed to advocate 
their interests.8 They were notably joined by Philip D. Reed, the CEO of General Electric who 
would chair the US Council, and the CEO of IBM, Thomas J. Watson, who had headed both 
the ICC and its American section during the 1930s and who provided the US Council office 
facilities at his firm’s headquarters in Manhattan.9 The companies of these two executives 
were among the country’s wealthiest and most international. The organisation they helped 
set up was clearly geared towards their peers. An analysis of the US Council trustees during 
those early years – all men – shows that they were at the helm of thirteen of the country’s 
twenty largest companies.10 Furthermore, the trustees included the executives in charge of 
the United States’ four biggest commercial banks. Half of early US Council trustees headed 
large manufacturing firms, especially in the automobile, pharmaceutical, electronics, food or 
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transportation sectors, of which two-thirds were among the country’s five-hundred wealthiest 
companies and at least four out of five had subsidiaries overseas.11 On the board there were 
also seven leaders of petroleum companies that made up half of all American revenues from 
oil, as well as eight media tycoons and representatives of about two dozen business 
associations.12
What did these powerful men hope to achieve through their participation in this associ-
ation which, after restructuring in 1949,13 took on the name of The United States Council of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, generally abbreviated to The US, they wanted to 
reproduce what the CED had performed on post-war planning by becoming, in the words 
of one of its leaders, advertising executive Sigurd S. Larmon a ‘top-level, policy-making body 
for US business on international economic problems’.14 It is, however, important to keep in 
mind that a new national and cross-industry BIA is created to defend certain specific interests 
of companies that occupy the same space in the economic marketplace, relating, for exam-
ple, to size, international orientation, or productivity. While NAM had been founded in 1895 
as a response to the depression and falling prices with the objective of finding both an outlet 
to overproduction of manufactured goods in foreign markets and gaining some control over 
competition by fostering planning and cooperation (Delton, 2020, pp. 19–38), the founding 
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in 1912, in coordination with the govern-
ment, was supposed to provide anxious business leaders with an answer to the uncertainty 
in the regulatory environment and the outcome of antitrust cases (Phillips Sawyer, 2016).
The main mission entrusted to the US Council in 1945 was that it should help create 
international economic conditions that would make it possible for US-based multinational 
companies to hugely expand investments, exports and production in the global arena. It 
should do so through the ICC. But it was also supposed to be a driving force in government 
support for this expansion. As Emily Rosenberg (1982, pp. 229–230) argued, by 1945 the US 
government had come to see the international expansionism of private businessmen as part 
of the ‘national interest’ of exporting ‘American influence’ and offered its active assistance. 
Given the disastrous state of Europe’s economy after the war, part of this assistance took the 
form of the Marshall Plan, the greatest foreign aid package in history. US Council leaders 
helped create and implement the Marshall Plan, which they saw as highly profitable for their 
economic interests in Western Europe. One of their founding members, the immensely 
wealthy cotton-trader William L. Clayton, would work towards its realisation from inside the 
government, as he was in charge of the State Department’s economic affairs until 1947, 
another, the president of the car company Studebaker Paul G. Hofmann, would lead the 
agency in charge of carrying out the Marshall Plan. Through numerous publications, con-
sultative meetings with the State Department and testimonies in hearings, the US Council 
actively participated in the Truman administration’s efforts to improve economic conditions 
in Western Europe and encourage European integration. Its executive members also whole-
heartedly supported the creation of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
October 1947, chiefly negotiated by Clayton, which would create an international framework 
for the reciprocal lowering of tariffs. The US Council therefore represented the leaders of 
large multinational companies who were in favour of the so-called New-Deal coalition, that 
is, they adopted a liberal approach towards the collaboration with Government and labour 
as well as towards commercial Keynesianism.15 C.D. Jackson, managing director of the inter-
national editions of the powerful media group Time and Life and member of the US Council’s 
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executive committee, painted a very vivid and grandiose picture of the US Council’s mission. 
He felt that it should lead a crusade to show businessmen that they
…’are part of the America that is a part of the world’. [That] the United States [is] democratic 
capitalism. Therefore, the businessman who is ignorant of this fact places the whole system in 
jeopardy, and the country as well. (…) Because the United States is a democratic capitalism, we 
should make a policy partnership of government and capitalism. We should concern ourselves 
with the reconstruction of Germany, the problems of Japan, the problems of Indonesia. 
Business (…) has no clubroom to write up the minutes of its own knowledge of these problems 
and its convictions, and no means of seeing that the government reads the minutes.16
The US Council should thus act as such a ‘clubroom’ and urge the Government to fight 
for the reduction of trade barriers and help stabilise international markets, which US multi-
nationals could then export to and invest in. Philip D. Reed put in more soberly: ‘We have 
got to [persuade] the Midwestern businessman that if private business withers abroad it will 
here’.17 The challenge was thus to promote the idea that better conditions for international 
trade–which the government should help establish–would directly benefit the interests of 
the US economy.
This role the US Council laid out for itself was not yet embodied in any existing BIA. The 
United States’ two most powerful business associations – the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States and NAM – represented a large array of companies both domestically and 
internationally oriented, which could not serve as a vehicle to defend the specific interests 
of free-trade multinationals. The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), although specialised 
in international matters, was seen by US Council members as exclusively and narrowly inter-
ested in export problems. In C. D. Jackson’s words, it was a ‘service organisation to tell me 
how I can do business in Holland or China. It is not concerned with the broad ideas and 
policies backing foreign trade’.18 The executives in the US Council thus saw a void among 
American BIAs their organisation could fill. They were however perfectly aware of the diffi-
culties it would present to convince the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States – both associations were among the two dozen business associations represented in 
the US Council – to accept its self-appointed role as spokesman for American global busi-
ness.19 Actually, both these BIAs protested the broader interpretation of its activities after 
its reorganisation in 1949. They specifically disapproved of its ambition to function as a 
business association with many more roles than simply representing American members of 
the International Chamber of Commerce.20
The US Council’s relations with existing BIAs and its ambition to leadership in the field of 
international economic policy are well illustrated by its actions regarding the creation of an 
International Trade Organisation (ITO). Post-war planners had intended the ITO to be part 
of the international institutions which would reform economic exchanges on an intergov-
ernmental basis and help prevent future financial crises and wars (Destler, 1986; Graz, 1999; 
Ariel Aaronson, 2015). Just like the World Bank and the IMF created in 1944 and 1945, the 
project of the ITO – meant to regulate commercial relations – was at first enthusiastically 
supported by the US Council men. C.D. Jackson wrote to Philip D. Reed on 1st of October 
1947, declaring: ‘…the underlying cause of all the world’s ills today is an unbalanced econ-
omy, and the only positive steps towards a solution are the establishment of a functioning 
ITO, and a soundly workable Marshall Plan’.21 One of the main hopes was that this new 
international organisation would allow to establish and implement a normative framework 
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to regulate international competition and notably create a code of conduct regarding cartels 
(Gerber, 2010, pp. 38–45). It was also supposed to regulate trade barriers – a function pro-
visionally taken care of by the GATT, which was meant to be integrated in the ITO. Planning 
for the ITO moved ahead in the winter of 1947–1948, when, at an International Conference 
on Trade and Employment in Cuba,22 the Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organisation was adopted and signed by the delegates of 53 countries.
This charter represented the turning point at which the ITO lost the support of business. 
Besides the regulation of international competition and trade barriers, the plan was that the 
ITO should also impose rules in various other domains, such as investment rights, domestic 
full employment policies or agricultural support. These ambitions were considered unfavour-
able to free enterprise, for instance not guaranteeing satisfying compensation for expropri-
ation of direct investment (Lovett et al., 2004, pp. 58–60). A forceful campaign was organised 
against the Charter, headed by a businessman who was both a member of the NAM’s 
International Relations Committee and the US Council’s executive committee: Philip Cortney, 
President of the cosmetics company Coty Inc.23 Cortney attacked the Charter for promoting 
socialist planning, which he threatened would ultimately lead to communism, a prognosis 
which reflected the new Cold War climate. He published a series of articles that were edited 
in a book in 1949 with the inflammatory title ‘The economic Munich’.24 The US Council was 
split over the Havana Charter, which led to many conflicts among its members.25 But in the 
light of hearings held in Congress on the ITO in 1950, the Council’s executive committee 
finally decided to follow the short majority among its leading members and to take an official 
stand opposing the Charter.26 The business campaign spearheaded by Cortney was successful: 
in the light of Congress’ almost certain refusal of the ITO, the Truman administration withdrew 
the proposal. Until the creation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, it was the GATT 
which would remain the main tool for international trade negotiations. Long hesitant and 
divided over the issue, the US Council had not been a strong protagonist in bringing down 
the ITO on the national level. However, it had been able to act through its membership in the 
ICC. It used its influence in the international business association to advocate for rejection of 
the ITO. In the opinion of Cortney, it had thus ultimately played a crucial role by increasing 
opposition in the ICC’s other national committees:
I think the [Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization] is an awful document. 
Today the Charter would be endorsed by all the national committees [of the International 
Chamber of Commerce] if it were not for [the US Council] …The first thing is to keep free trade 
in the world – we have done that. … If they had adopted all the crazy ideas in the Charter you 
would have defeated liberalism today.27
The US Council’s lobbying in the ICC on the ITO underlines how prominent the interna-
tional organisation based in Paris was in the American association’s activities. The ICC was 
less influential during the years following World War II than it had been after World War I 
because of the central role played by US planners (Kelly, 2005, p. 262). This was one of the 
reasons for which it established a formal relationship with the United Nations acquiring a 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (EcoSoc) in 1946. The US Council 
had played a leading role in this affiliation. In its 1955 Annual Report, its executive director, 
Lloyd K. Neidlinger, wrote that the US Council’s benefits from participating in the ICC had 
expanded as: ‘the International Chamber has become to an ever increasing extent the busi-
ness organisation most frequently consulted by the Economic and Social Council of the UN, 
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the Council of Europe, the Contracting Parties to GATT, and numerous other intergovern-
mental agencies’.28 This possibility of directly influencing the main international organisations 
justified, in his eyes, the dozens of meetings of ICC commissions in Paris the US Council had 
participated in that past year, and the comments and criticism on ‘approximately one hun-
dred documents drafted by these commissions’.29 Arguably, at that time, the American sec-
tion was the most powerful among the ICC’s fifty national committees, as it still is today, and 
dominated the organisation, alongside its Western European partners (Kelly, 2005, p. 270). 
This was notably demonstrated by its financial contribution, as since 1945 it provided approx-
imately a third of the ICC’s budget. It regularly sent the largest delegations to the ICC con-
gresses, for example to the 1955 congress in Tokyo, when over one hundred American 
delegates participated, more than half of which were US businessmen residing in Japan or 
neighbouring countries. The agenda the US Council tried to push through its affiliation with 
the ICC consisted of two main campaigns: help enforce the set of rules established by the 
GATT to create conditions for freer and more stable international trade and fight different 
barriers to increased foreign investment such as double-taxation.
The US Council hence engaged in many efforts to place itself in a strong and unique position 
among US business organisations, symbolised in its selling prospectus of the beginning of the 
1950s entitled ‘The World Voice of Free Business’. However, it struggled to achieve recognition 
for the role it envisioned and, in the words of C.D. Jackson, remained plagued by a certain 
‘schizophrenia as to what it actually is’.30 The split purpose between simply acting as the US 
component of the ICC and its ambitions to intervene in the defence of international business 
thinking both at the highest level of US government and abroad, created tensions. The organ-
isation faced declining membership and financial difficulties. Furthermore, during the US 
Council’s early years, its relationship to the ICC was a matter for continuous disagreement 
among its leading members. Some of them wished to loosen the ties with the international 
body, to focus more prominently on the mission of carrying certain principles into world 
affairs.31 Accordingly, when discussing the change of name in 1949, they put forward sugges-
tions, which completely eliminated any reference to the ICC, such as Central Association of Free 
Businessmen or The International Chamber of Commerce of the USA, thought to have more 
appeal. The majority of the executives invested in the Council, however, saw the need to main-
tain strong relations with the international organisation, notably to set the US Council apart 
from other BIAs.32 In 1949, it was especially Reed who advocated for strong ties with the ICC in 
the reorganisation committee, which certainly was also in line with the fact that he would go 
on to serve as the international chamber’s president for the two following years.
As the ICC’s international standing increased, it was no longer the institutional ties to this 
association that were questioned, but the lack of recognition for it in the US business world. 
S.C. Allyn, president of the National Cash Register Company and chair of a new committee 
set up in 1962 to think about how to make the US Council more effective, declared, in 
November 1962: ‘The US Council of the International Chamber of Commerce is recognised 
by relatively few people in this country. Many of the achievements of the Council are mis-
takenly credited to the US Chamber of Commerce; others are not recognised at all. Yet, in 
other parts of the world the ICC is recognised as being the only existing international organ-
isation of businessmen representing all types of commercial activity’.33 In order to increase 
the political leverage and recognition of the US Council, he recommended that ‘Specific US 
international business problems should play more of a role in the work of the Council’.34 The 
US Council followed this advice during the 1960s by embracing the cause of MNE’s foreign 
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direct investments which was more directly valuable to business leaders than the more 
abstract activities in the ICC.
The US council and the rising power of multinational companies
In the 1950s, there was an immense world-wide rise of foreign direct investment,35 initi-
ating a second period of globalisation, which would further accelerate after 1979 (Jones, 
2007). The overall value of United States FDI stock, inflation-adjusted, more than doubled 
between 1950 and 1960 and continued to rise (see Figure 1). New investment was pre-
dominantly flowing towards Canada and Western Europe. It is thus fair to say that the 
international interests of the United States’ top companies grew considerably in the 
1960s.36 These capital flows were at the centre of an intense political debate in the 1960s 
and came to be seen by political authorities as a possible leverage to reduce the balance 
of payments deficit. The United States’ balance of payments liquidity deficit had in fact 
dramatically increased after 1958, as a consequence of tremendous military and aid expen-
ditures, the diminishing trade surplus and private capital moving abroad in the form of 
FDI or portfolio investments, which European central banks were increasingly exchanging 
for gold (Gavin, 2004; Schaufelbuehl, 2013). The entire Bretton Woods system was put into 
jeopardy because of the deficit and the outflow of gold. It was in this context that the 
Kennedy administration presented a series of tax proposals to Congress in April 1961, 
which would result in the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1962.37
The initial proposals included measures aimed at reducing FDI in developed countries,38 
but they were ultimately defeated, largely as a consequence of powerful business-led oppo-
sition.39 Three years later, the Johnson administration enacted a voluntary balance of pay-
ments program, which again sought to control the overall impact of FDI on the deficit.40 The 
companies with substantial overseas investments were asked to submit periodic reports to 
the officials of the Department of Commerce, which oversaw the program, assisted by a 
balance of payments advisory committee, composed of business and bank leaders. With the 
Figure 1. us Direct investment stocks in different regions, in millions of us dollars, deflated (1967 = 0), 
1950–1974.39
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worsening deficit and the spiralling costs of the Vietnam War, Lyndon B. Johnson introduced 
mandatory controls of FDI on 1 January 1968, with a complete moratorium of direct invest-
ment in continental Europe.41 In light of the government’s attempts to restrain US-based 
multinationals’ investments abroad, a vivid debate emerged in the 1960s on the effects of 
FDI on the balance of payments, with representatives of the private sector – be it the Balance 
of payments advisory committee of the Department of Commerce,42 different business 
groups, certain media outlets – pleading that in the long term these capital flows had a 
beneficial impact on the balance of payments, through the return of revenue, and the 
increase of exports by the parent company.43
It was in this context that the US Council took on a role that seemed to be cut out for it. In 
this regard, it is important to point out that the organisation was still run by the top executives 
of some of the United States’ largest companies, which were increasingly investing overseas. 
Case in point: in 1962, the US Council’s board of trustees included thirty-seven senior execu-
tives each heading one of the country’s wealthiest one-hundred companies.44 The issue of 
FDI was thus central to the preoccupations of the executives most involved with the US 
Council. When the Kennedy administration’s proposals on FDI were discussed on Capitol Hill, 
the US Council seized the opportunity and set up a special committee. This committee, chaired 
by Jack Heinz II, chief executive of the food processing company H.J. Heinz, and composed 
of three other businessmen, played a leading role in organising business opposition during 
the hearings.45 It is true that all major national cross-industry business associations sent a 
representative to testify against the proposals. On the 5th and 6th of June 1961, besides Fred 
W. Peel, acting chairman of the Committee on taxation who spoke for the US Council, repre-
sentatives of the Chamber of Commerce of the US, the NAM and the NFTC also testified.46 
Unlike the other groups however, the US Council did not rely solely on official direct inter-
ventions, but also pulled the strings behind two other, officially independent testimonies. 
Firstly, Emilio G. Collado, Director and Vice President of the Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey and member of the US Council’s special Committee made a long intervention, speaking 
in the name of his firm and arguing that Standard Oil’s foreign direct investments had a 
decisively positive effect on the balance of payment.47 More importantly, the US Council 
secretly organised another address, which was to have a major impact in the hearings. Jack 
Heinz took the floor on 8 June 1961 to declare that he was representing the ‘Industry 
Committee on Foreign Investments’, composed of 19 companies, among which his own. He 
did not mention any connection to the US Council.48 The reason why this testimony made a 
powerful impression, was that Heinz presented detailed data from these firms that showed 
a positive effect of their foreign subsidiaries on the balance of payments, through the return 
of revenues and an increase in exports. This statement by a seemingly independent company 
executive on behalf of several other major firms made a big splash and was written about in 
the Press.49
Heinz’s testimony did not go down well with one Senator however, the Democrat Albert 
Gore Sr. When the tax proposals had passed on to the Senate a year later and Fred W. Peel 
was again testifying on behalf of the US Council, Gore angrily stated: ‘For almost a year now, 
I have been trying to learn the origin of this group for which Mr. Heinz presented testimony’. 
Gore said that he had just found out that this ‘Industry Committee on Foreign Investments’ 
had in reality been organised by the US Council, through the Committee it set up in December 
1960 under Heinz’s chairmanship. The senator went on to say that the testimony presented 
by Heinz in June 1961 was based on distorted results and ‘an organised effort to mislead a 
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committee of the US Congress’ by ‘a group organised for that purpose’.50 He believed that 
the 19 companies were not at all typical and had been strategically chosen for having higher 
exports than a typical firm and a higher percentage of revenues returned to the United 
States, and that the figures had furthermore been presented in a distorted fashion. Gore 
ironically concluded: ‘If one assumes these 19 companies are typical, then the best way to 
solve our balance-of-payments problem, the best way to solve our unemployment problem, 
is to move all our factories and our industry and our business abroad’.51
The setting up of the ‘Industry Committee on Foreign Investments’ by the US Council and 
the testimonies of Peel, Collado and Heinz show that the organisation took the lead in 
organising the defence of the multinationals’ interests in the early 1960s, putting more 
energy into this battle than the NAM or the Chamber of Commerce of the US. In this regard 
it is interesting to point out that these two heavy weights among BIAs had for their part also 
testified against the domestic components of the tax proposals, notably the investment tax 
credit, whereas the NFTC and the US Council focused their attention exclusively on the 
question of FDI. Given its overall purpose since 1945 of promoting the specific interests of 
US-based MNEs, it is not surprising that the US Council put so much time and ressorces into 
this campaign. It furthermore relied on this issue in order to gain new member companies. 
Thus, when the first battle against Kennedy’s proposals had been won, it used this success 
to campaign for membership. In September 1961, the Council’s chairman, Ralph T. Reed, 
President of The American Express Company, sent letters to dozens of firms boasting that 
the House Committee had dropped ‘one of the worst items’ of the tax proposals, ‘in line with 
our testimony’.52 He added that there remained other problems in the proposals which 
needed to be fought and were being addressed by three special US Council working groups 
and concluded: ‘[I] genuinely hope that your company will want to help in this fight by 
subscribing a membership.’53 This membership drive was successful. Two months later, ten 
new companies had already joined the US Council, of which five were Fortune 500 ranked 
firms, such as Reynold Metals or the asbestos producer Johns-Manville Corporation.54 This 
accomplishment justified the fact that during those months, as pointed out in an internal 
note in October 1961, the ‘greatest portions of the Council’s energies [were] directed towards 
the Administration’s tax proposals’.55
Philip D. Reed’s appeal to Campbell Soup in November 1963 to join the US Council was 
less successful. The company’s president declined, explaining that Campbell Soup was in 
an ‘early stage of our international activities’ in Australia, Mexico and four European countries 
and was already a member of business associations, notably of the NFTC.56 Reed’s reply to 
Campbell is interesting as he insisted that the US Council ‘does not duplicate to any significant 
degree the functions of the NFTC’ of which ‘many if not most of our members are also mem-
bers’. He went on to highlight the importance of the Council’s work in the ICC to promote 
free enterprise globally and evoked that at their upcoming annual meeting, themes such as 
the balance of payments problem or international monetary policy would be discussed, in 
the presence of high-ranking members of government. Reed’s reply shows that the US 
Council continued to use the argument of its affiliation with the ICC to try to make its case, 
but now also pointed out its activities concerning US government policies.
The US Council’s double-track orientation continued during this period. It invested much 
time and efforts into its role as the affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce. This 
connection offered member companies two main advantages. On the one hand, it repre-
sented a formidable occasion for establishing networks with potential business partners 
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abroad. The Council’s chairman in 1966, Arthur K. Watson, highlighted this benefit in a 
brochure used for the organisation’s membership campaign: The CEOs have the opportunity 
to set up contacts with industrial leaders in their field in foreign countries, which ‘is done 
continually on an informal basis or, more formally, at the biennial Congress of ICC’.57 In April 
1959, the Council hosted the 17th ICC Congress, bringing hundreds of leading international 
businessmen to Washington D.C.58 Regularly, representatives of the ICC would also be invited 
to speak at US Council meetings in the United States, which presented further occasions for 
members to bolster their networks.
The second leverage ICC participation gave the US Council, was to help shape the inter-
national organisation’s policies; for instance in 1961 when it played a central role in setting 
up the ICC’s campaign to limit the global taxation of MNEs.59 It would often try to reduce 
the influence of other national sections not in line with its own policies. For example, while 
preparing the Montreal Congress in 1967, it considered the statement which was being 
prepared too heavily influenced by Norway and thus according ‘the State a considerably 
larger role than would be acceptable or desirable in the United States’. Council leaders 
especially wanted to eliminate the positive consideration of membership of government 
representatives on corporate boards since ‘it is very difficult to get government participation 
in corporate affairs without politics’.60 The US Council’s potential to shape general ICC policy 
was amplified by the fact that it supported the lion’s share of its finances, as we have seen. 
Given the ICC’s increasing budget, the US Council decided to lower the part it came up for 
to 25% in 1961, but again increased it to 28% in 1964, which then represented $100,000.61
Parallel to these endeavours in the ICC, the US Council put much energy into the crusade 
for MNEs’ interests on a domestic level, notably in relation to the American government. It 
can be argued that its investment in the cause of US companies’ international business 
interests had also contributed to the fact that it was invited by the Kennedy administration 
in the fall of 1961 to form a national committee to represent business in the OECD, along 
with the NFTC, the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce  of the US.62 This invitation would 
lead to the US Council being one of the four organisations that formed the USA-BIAC, offi-
cially established in March 1962. When the US Council Executive Committee discussed the 
issue in September 1961, George Nebolsine – partner of one of the world’s most influential 
international law firms Coudert Brothers – ‘stressed the importance to the US Council of 
protecting its status as the principal representative of the international interests of the 
American business community by participating on equal terms with the NAM and US 
Chamber in any consortium that might be formed to advise the OECD and the US govern-
ment officials concerned with OECD affairs’.63 The US Council’s successful integration in the 
USA-BIAC alongside much older and more established business organisations was thus seen 
by the businessmen at its top as affirming the group’s claim to represent American business’ 
international interests. US Council members also actively participated in the different for-
mations of the transatlantic business community. Nebolsine, for instance, along with other 
leading US Council members such as C.D. Jackson, Emilio G. Collado or Jack Heinz were 
regular participants of the Bilderberg meetings all through the 1950s and 1960s 
(Aubourg, 2010).
In 1966, in a renewed effort to restructure the US Council in order to make it the ‘recognised 
voice of international business’, an International Economic Policy Committee was set up, 
which was to focus on domestic political issues, notably the impact of US private capital on 
the balance of payments.64 At the same time, it was decided to appoint a professional 
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economist, even though this meant having to close the organisation’s internal public relations 
department.65 Judd K. Polk was hired that same year, an economist who had been in the 
government’s secret services during the war, and who would play an important role for the 
US Council in fighting the Johnson administration’s mandatory capital controls. The growing 
importance of US companies’ international investments did not only have an impact on the 
US Council. Towards the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, MNEs also started to 
play a more important role in the NFTC whose agenda became increasingly influenced by 
their preoccupations (Gamble, 2014, p. 53, p. 68). The Chamber of Commerce of the US created 
a Special advisory panel on the balance of payments, in which the US Council economist Polk 
participated, and which was commissioned by the Nixon administration to make recommen-
dations on the relaxation of the capital controls.66 The NAM again became more active on 
international policies as well in 1968, leading a vigorous campaign against the FDI controls, 
and two years later set up several ad hoc committees on foreign trade, the multinational 
company and international monetary policy.67 Arguably, by its early and decisive interventions 
in the field of balance of payments measures, the US Council had however succeeded in 
gaining a certain degree of legitimacy next to these older and larger business groups.
A few months after Richard Nixon’s inauguration, his administration very significantly 
lightened the capital controls in April 1969.68 Although Nixon had promised to abolish them 
entirely during his campaign, he backtracked for different reasons, notably the wish not to 
convey the impression to European governments that the administration was not taking 
the balance of payments deficit seriously enough or was risking an international payments 
crisis.69 Despite this setback to their initial hopes, business leaders were generally satisfied 
with the Republican president’s new balance of payments program. It was in part inspired 
by recommendations made by the major BIAs, the US Council included. Even though an 
important battle against the capital controls had therefore been won, the US Council con-
tinued to try to benefit from its role in this campaign, which had allowed it to justify its 
membership drive during the 1960s. Hence, at the initiative of Arthur K. Watson, Thomas J. 
Watson’s son at the head of IBM’s international operations, the Executive Committee decided 
in January 1970 to launch a survey on the effects of the foreign direct investment controls. 
The reason for this new campaign against the balance of payment program was to keep 
alive the authority of representing the interests of US-based multinationals. As Watson 
remarked, since no other business group was at that time taking any initiatives in this area, 
this investment could ‘demonstrate to the members that the Council is active on their major 
concerns’.70 Sixty companies participated in the survey and the results were presented in a 
national press conference in July 1970. George Ball, partner in Lehman Brothers and former 
Under Secretary of State, acted as a spokesman for the US Council. The survey’s conclusion 
presented to the Press was that American companies had continued foreign direct invest-
ment by relying on foreign borrowings in the Eurodollar market.71 The US Council again 
stated that it was favourable to eliminating or phasing out the capital controls all together.
Overall, the US Council’s commitment to defending the rising investments by US-based 
multinationals mainly in Western Europe against any attempt to curb these flows by taxation 
or restrictions had contributed to establishing it firmly in the midst of American national 
BIAs. In 1972, before the financial crisis temporarily affected its membership, the board of 
Trustees was a true image of the United States’ most powerful business leaders. Twelve out 
of the twenty wealthiest companies had delegated their presidents or CEOs to the US 
Council.72 Twenty-eight of the biggest banks and financial institutions were represented on 
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the board among which almost all sizeable commercial banks and alongside eight major 
international law firms. The extractive and metal industries still held an important role, with 
most of the main oil, mining and steel companies on the board. Of the seventy-four manu-
facturing firms (in the pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, automobile, food, and machine-tool 
industries), forty-seven, that is over 60%, belonged to the United States’ three-hundred 
wealthiest firms. In general, a comparison of the membership composition between 1948–
1951 and 1972 reveals the following: There were twice as many financial institutions repre-
sented on the US Council board of trustees, and 19 more manufacturing companies. Retail 
businesses had disappeared from the board, and during the rise of business protectionism 
in the 1950s, the chemical firms Monsanto and the Allied Chemical corporation had left the 
US Council. On the other hand, such powerful companies as Eli Lilly and Company, Merck & 
Company, PepsiCo Incorporated, the Xerox corporation and Polaroid corporation had newly 
joined since the beginning of the 1960s. Overall, the US Council seems to have convinced 
the leaders of the largest companies in the manufacturing, extractive and financial industry 
that it was a worthy advocate for their international interests.
Conclusion
Since its constitution as an independent BIA in 1945, the US Council pursued its ambition 
of defending the specific interests of capital-intensive US-based MNEs hoping to increase 
their global operations. It did so successfully by participating in the creation and implemen-
tation of the Truman administration’s major policy programs, from the Marshall Plan to the 
setting up of the GATT and the encouragement of European integration. It also acted deci-
sively through the ICC and significantly shaped this international business association’s 
policies during the first three post-war decades. Its relationship with the ICC was both an 
asset and a liability, as Emilio G. Collado of Standard Oil recalled in December 1965, when 
he said that the US Council had ‘suffered to some degree from being part of an international 
organisation because [it] had let the international body dictate too much of [its] daily activity 
to the detriment of the organisation’s work on US problems which should be considered 
with our own Government’.73 However, this difficulty was circumvented by the major cam-
paigns the US Council led during the 1960s to fight first the Kennedy administration’s efforts 
to limit the capital outflows to Western Europe through tax measures, and then the restric-
tions on these capital flows imposed by the Johnson administration. Its investment in these 
policy deliberations specifically had the advantage of allowing for a more convincing argu-
ment for potential member companies of why they should join the US Council than the 
relatively abstract affiliation with the ICC. In this regard, the US Council’s membership struc-
ture confirms that it was largely considered a mouthpiece for their interests by many of the 
largest and most international manufacturing companies, banks, consulting firms and oil 
companies. After 1962, its participation in the US business representation at the OECD, the 
BIAC, further cemented its legitimacy. At the time the capital controls were definitely abol-
ished in 1974, the US Council had managed to gain an actual credibility as a business organ-
isation representing the interests of American MNEs. That same year it opened an office in 
Washington DC to further promote its pursuit of becoming a legitimate partner of the gov-
ernment, representing the global interests of big business in the United States.
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